Introduction

This campaign, executed by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, covered almost all of the period of the Great War, from November 1914 through to the Armistice of Mudros on 30th October, 1918. No fewer than nine of our sixty fallen took part in this conflict. Throughout it was under-reported and the British public either knew little of the detail or simply viewed it as an unnecessary drain on military resources that could be better spent on the Western Front.

The conflict was similar to that in Mesopotamia”also a Cinderella’ campaign: the protection of British interests against threat from the Ottoman Empire which was backed by German and Austria. Both began to protect vital assets (Mesopotamia, oil and Egypt the Suez Canal) but expanded by mission creep into wider conflicts with high casualties from battle and illness.

At its inception, this campaign was restricted to Egypt”the conflict did not move north into Palestine until early 1917.

Beginnings

In the early phase, Ottoman forces assembled in Palestine preparatory to an incursion into Egyptian territory to disrupt or prevent use of the Suez Canal, with the first wave of attacks coming between 26th January and 4th February, 1915.

The defence of the Canal was initially in the hands of the 30,000-strong Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, supported by Egyptian Army and Indian artillery. Sinai was largely undefended and the attacking Ottomans had a straightforward approach to the Canal from their territory in southern Palestine. In the first attacks, only two Ottoman Companies succeeded in crossing the Canal, and, broadly, the conflict quickly became one of warfare with two armies separated by the Canal. British and Commonwealth troops occupied the western side, and Ottomans the eastern shore. However, this allowed the attackers to disrupt any shipping passing through the Canal.

By the end of 1915 it had become clear that defending the Canal from the West Bank was impossible and the War Cabinet, following the advice of Lord Kitchener, authorised defensive lines to be moved across the Canal and at least 11,000 yards into the Sinai Peninsular. The buffer zone would keep the Canal safe from heavy artillery fire. An increase of men and equipment was also authorised to enable this and as a result shipping was again able to pass unmolested.

In December 1915, the ignominious ending of the Gallipoli campaign resulted in men and materials being withdrawn, much of it to Egypt, where, by early 1916, 400,000 infantry and cavalry were stationed. All resources were brought together under Sir Archibald Murray as a new Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF). While generally these troops provided and Army Reserve for all Theatres of War (including the Western Front), they provided the means to control Ottoman ambitions in Egypt.

The First Battle of Gaza on 26th March, 1917, was an inconclusive affair. Anzac and Imperial forces made early gains, taking all objectives before withdrawal at nightfall. Had the Command better understood their daytime successes they may well have had continued success. As a result, the Ottoman defences remained largely intact and a stand-off ensued, during which time the defences of Gaza were further strengthened, as was the whole of the Ottoman line inland to Beersheba. Murray’s problems were exacerbated by his loose wording in reports sent back to England”these led to an assumption of victory and orders to advance to take Jerusalem. The Second Battale of Gaza took place from 17th to 19th April, with troops attacking across open ground towards the newly constructed defences. Losses were heavy for little gain. The result was a stalemate and an entrenched conflict more redolent of the Western Front. Despite a well-fought Suez-Sinai campaign, these setbacks and failures were sufficient to precipitate Murray being relieved of his command and recalled to England. His replacement was Bloody Bull Edmund Allenby.

It was not until November of 1917 that the stand-off was ended with what became known as the Third battle of Gaza. Perhaps this is a misnomer as the actions referred to are mostly of the dismantling of the defences around Gaza itself, and the defensive lines that ran inland to the southeast, ending at Beersheba. Beginning on 27th October, a heavy six-day bombardment”the heaviest of WWI outside Europe”preceded night raids on strategic defences. Scottish infantry played a large part in the successes of the attacks which were at some cost.

The combined use of land and off-shore bombardment, aerial bombing, and infantry attacks on defensive tranches and strongholds around Gaza continued until, on November 7th, the EEF was able to take the city itself with little opposition”the Ottomans had withdrawn and left it largely unoccupied. The day before, Allenby had predicted this would be the case:

The whole of the defensive line from the Gaza on the coastal plain to Beersheba had been systematically dismantled and the gateway to Palestine now lay open to the EEF.

There was still some hard fighting ahead. The Battle of Nebi Samwill (17-24 November) led to the Battle of Jerusalem (17 November-9 December) and its capture. The surrender read:

Allenby made his formal entry into Jerusalem through the Jaffa Gate on 11th December, 1917. He did so on foot, eschewing the more dignified motor transport or horseback in deference to the holiness of the city. The scene is not empty theatre; its significance cannot be overplayed. For the Ottomans it inflicted huge hurt to its morale and identity, having previously lost the holy places of Mecca and Baghdad. To the Allied cause, it was a much-needed fillip at the end of a disappointing and draining year.

Allenby’s official proclamation, in response to the above surrender, made on 9 December 1917 reads as follows:

In an awareness which would not be out of place today, Allenby took great care to ban the use of any use of Crusader imagery or language, giving his Press Officers strict instructions to this effect. He always emphasised that the conflict was with the Ottoman Empire and not Islam.